Employment Research Newsletter
Volume 20

Number 4

Article 2

10-1-2013

Licensing Occupations: How Time and Regulatory Attainment
Matter
Morris M. Kleiner
University of Minnesota

Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/empl_research
Part of the Labor Economics Commons

Citation
Kleiner, Morris M. 2013. "Licensing Occupations: How Time and Regulatory Attainment Matter."
Employment Research 20(4): 4-6. https://doi.org/10.17848/1075-8445.20(4)-2

This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact repository@upjohn.org.

Employment Research
the private sector is facilitated by six staff
members of the LWIB, who continually
call on businesses to inquire about the
type of skills businesses require. They
also conduct focus groups and pursue
other means to obtain and follow current
local conditions.
Conclusion
The joint study examined cases in
which LWIBs have worked within
the flexibility and decentralization of
the U.S. workforce system to foster
collaboration among local organizations.
It observed that there was no one right
way to form effective partnerships.
Rather, the flexibility of the workforce
system allowed LWIBs to bring key
stakeholders and organizations together
in ways that worked best for job seekers
and employers, which can enhance job
creation. The study also underscored
the benefit of working closely with
businesses to understand their needs for
qualified workers and to design training
curricula that address those needs.
Furthermore, WIA’s culture of evidencebased policy making and performance
outcome monitoring established by WIA
workforce programs sets an example for
other organizations within the local area
to follow.
Note
The assistance of Jonathan Barr and
Francesca Froy of the OECD/LEED and
Robert Straits of the Upjohn Institute in
preparing the full U.S. report is greatly
appreciated.
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Licensing Occupations

How Time and Regulatory Attainment Matter
This article highlights some of the findings in
the author’s new book, Stages of Occupational
Regulation: Analysis of Case Studies,
published by the W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research. See the back cover for
information on how to order the book.

G

eorge Shultz, the astute
academic, businessman, Secretary of
Labor, and later premier statesman,
opined that from his long years in
government service, lags occur with
general public policy issues, but that
politicians are impatient (Shultz 1995).
Occupational licensing generally fits this
model, since it is an institution whose
effects are not immediately apparent, but
rather reveal their efficacy over some
time. Specifically, occupational licensing
usually grandfathers in practitioners,
implements new exams, and develops
educational and location-specific
requirements so that implementing
these policies usually takes many years.
Consequently, the labor market or
consumer outcomes are not immediately
apparent—a longer-run perspective is
required to fully understand the wage,
price, quality, and distributional effects.
An approach that evaluates the various
stages of occupational regulation can
help capture and illuminate the role
that licensing has in labor and service
markets.
As I point out in an earlier volume,
unions and licensing membership are
moving in different directions (Kleiner
2006; Kleiner and Krueger 2013).
As shown in Figure 1, occupational
licensing has continued to grow in the
United States in contrast to the decline of
unionization. For example, in the 1950s
and early 1960s, less than 10 percent of
the workforce required an occupational
license to work for pay. However, by
2008, estimates from the Princeton Data
Improvement Initiative show that about
29 percent of the workforce required
a license from local, state, or federal
government to work for pay. With the

decline of union membership and the
growth of employment in the service
sector, workers and their agents (unions
or professional associations) have
attempted to establish a “web of rules” to
regularize work and reduce competition
in the field (Dunlop 1958).
Occupations are rarely formed as
licensed ones. Occupations evolve,
organize, and often select licensing as
a method to obtain professionalism,
quality, and status, as well as to limit
the supply of practitioners. They
tax their members through dues and
engage in political activities that lead to
registration, certification, and eventually
licensing. The process of regulation
across political jurisdictions often takes
years or decades to achieve full licensure.
Consequently, new occupations are
often in varying stages of the regulatory
process as they seek to become regulated
by units of government. Since regulation
mainly influences new entrants, it would
take some time before the full effect
of licensing would influence either
the individuals in the occupation (in
terms of wages and employment) or the
consumers of their services. It usually
takes some time for individuals who are
grandfathered into the occupation, and
have less measured human capital than
newly regulated practitioners, to retire
or leave the job. Occupations at a more
mature stage of regulation would be more
likely to have the benefits or advantages
of the various stages of licensing than
those that have recently sought or
obtained regulation at different levels of
government.
In the book Stages of Occupational
Regulation: Analysis of Case Studies, I
examine seven occupations at various
stages of regulation generally moving
from low to universal. A goal of the
book is to examine a broad variety
of occupations that include blue- and
white-collar occupations at different
stages of occupational regulation by
government. The occupations examined
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in the book are listed in Figure 2 by the
number of states that licensed them in
2007, the starting point of my analysis.
They go from interior designers, who
are regulated in only three states and the
District of Columbia, to dental hygienists
and dentists, who are licensed in all
states and are required to have a license
to do their work. For dentists and dental
hygienists, a competition develops
between the occupations over who is
allowed to supervise and which tasks are
permitted for each occupational group.
The level of rigor of the regulations
for an occupation, and the longer the
occupation has been licensed, do matter
in key labor market outcomes such as
wages and employment.
The central findings using various
governmental databases are shown in
Table 1. As an occupation progresses
from less to more regulation, the
influence of licensing becomes larger.
The major effects of licensing on
wage determination do not become
consequential until an occupation is
universally licensed for a substantial
period of time, and nearly all in the
occupation must be licensed. For
occupations such as interior designers,
preschool teachers, and even mortgage
brokers, the influence of occupational
licensing is minimal or modest. Of
the occupations examined, the largest
influence of occupational licensing on
wage determination is for dentists and
hygienists—virtually all individuals in
these occupations must attain licensure.
For electricians and plumbers, the
wage effects of regulation are modest
to moderate, and having state by state
licensing does not appear to have an
influence on the work-related health
and safety of workers as measured by
occupational deaths or injuries. For
mortgage brokers, having a bonding
requirement is modestly associated with
higher earnings, but it did not appear to
enhance consumer well-being. Similarly,
greater regulation of preschool teachers
did not raise earnings, but it did have
a small negative influence on access to
center-based care and had no overall
effect on student test scores.
A review of the licensing literature
found that for many occupations in the
United States, the length of time that the
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Figure 1 Trends in Two Labor Market Institutions
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Figure 2 Number of States Requiring Licensing for Seven Occupations, 2007
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Table 1 Summary of Key Findings in the Volume
Occupation

Level of occupational
regulation
Labor market effects

Interior designers

Low

None to modest wage State efforts to become
and employment
universally licensed
effects

Mortgage brokers

Low to moderate

Modest wage and
employment effects

Recent moves to gain
universal licensing, more
regulation has murky
effects on consumers

Preschool instructors
and related assistants

Moderate

Modest to no wage
effects

Movement to universal
licensing, little evidence
of major influences on
academic performance

Electricians and
plumbers

High

Moderate wage
effects

Movement to make
regulations more
stringent, little evidence
of any influence on
worker safety

Dentists and dental
hygienists

Universal

Moderate to high
wage effects

Relaxed regulations result
in gains for hygienists at
the expense of dentists

licensing had been in effect mattered and
was positive; a national study analyzing
UK data found similar results. Further,
the key factor in the effects of licensing
on wage determination was whether
the individual attained a license rather
than if the state passed a licensing law
generally regulating the occupation. Two
occupations that differ in this respect
yet illustrate the point are dentists
and engineers. Occupational licensing
would be expected to have a larger
influence on dentists, where almost all
individuals who identify themselves as

Other

dentists have a license. Only a licensed
dentist can perform or supervise most
dental procedures for pay by state law.
In contrast, for engineers, who are
universally covered by licensing laws,
only a minority of engineers seeks or
obtains a license from the government
(Hur, Kleiner, and Wang 2013). Most
tasks that engineers perform are not ones
that require a license from government.
Only a relatively small number of jobs
that engineers perform are explicitly
regulated by law. Consequently, the
impact of licensing on wages and
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employment are much smaller for
engineers than for dentists.
Occupational licensing influences the
labor market for licensed and unlicensed
practitioners. It affects the ability and
costs for consumers to obtain important
services. Moreover, it determines the
distribution of those services among the
well-off and those in or near poverty.
It also helps to determine the structure
of markets where service market
monopolies are provided by government.
As the politics of occupational licensing
ebbs and flows with economic and
political trends, it is important to
shine the light on data and analysis to
determine both the equity and efficiency
aspects through the various stages of the
evolution of occupational licensing.
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